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WORLD HABEAS CORPUS AND HUMANITARIAN
INTERVENTION
LuIs KUTNER*
The situation of our time
Surrounds us like a baffling crime...
And all re suspects and involved
Until the mystery is solved
And under lock and key the cause
That makes a nonsense of our laws . . .
Yet our equipment all the time
Extends the area of the crime
Until the guilt is everywhere,
And more and more we are aware,
However miserable may be
Our parish of immediacy,
How small it is, how far beyond,
Ubiquitous within the bond
Of one improverishing sky,
Vast spiritual disorders lie.
From W.H. Auden, "New Year Letter",
January 1, 1940.
Human intervention and World Habeas Corpus while seemingly
antithetical, may be dialectically synthesized. World Habeas Corpus,
a legal ligament of international order, envisions the establishment
of an institution for the protection of the freedom of the individual:
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a system of international tribunals, reflecting the world's legal systems
to which any individual who has been arbitrarily detained by any
municipal authority and has exhausted all domestic remedies, may by
right turn to, for a writ of World Habeas Corpus to order his release
or to require the detaining authority to justify his detention. In con-
trast, humanitarian intervention, as a doctrine, in practice reflects the
prevalence of a lawless world wherein sovereign states will, in cer-
tain circumstances, intervene in what would otherwise be the domestic
affairs of other states to protect fundamental human rights in cir-
cumstances which have shocked the conscience of humanity.
Absent other effective means for the individual enforcement of
international principles of human rights, humanitarian intervention is
the means by which states, as subjects of international law, may act
where the conscience of humanity is shocked. World Habeas Corpus,
conversely, conceives of the individual as a subject of international
law, able by international right to protect his freedom.
On the other hand, the doctrine of humanitarian intervention
was the original precedent for making human rights a matter of in-
ternational law and concern in the era of sovereign states and, in this
sense, is the forebearer of World Habeas. Moreover, in the absence
of effective means for the implementation of human rights, the doc-
trine of humanitarian intervention can be invoked to complement
World Habeas or to enforce quasi World Habeas Corpus decrees by
international tribunals, e.g. the Human Rights Commission or the In-
ternational Court. This would provide a means by which states may
have standing in matters affecting human rights. Based on the fore-
going principles and propositions this paper endeavors to critically
analyze the doctrine of humanitarian intervention in relation to the
proposal for World Habeas Corpus and to suggest an institutionalized
means for the protection and the implementation of fundamental
human rights.
According to the accepted definition of humanitarian intervention,
a state may interfere in the internal affairs of another state if that
state conducts itself inhumanely towards its subjects in breach of the
fundamental principles of civilized government and shocks the con-
science of mankind. The general prohibition against domestic interven-
tion in the domestic affairs of a state does not prevail where flagrant
injustices or despicable atrocities have been committed within its
jurisdiction.' Assistance by a state to protect the rights of its own
1. Feinberg, International Protection of Human Rights and The Jewish Ques-
tion (An Historical Survey), 3 Is. L. REV. 487 (1968).
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nationals in another state cannot be classified as humanitarian pro-
tection, but, involves rather, the protection of nationals abroad.! This
view is not universally held, however.
Not all legal scholars accept the doctrine of humanitarian
intervention The basic obligation of international law is to refrain
from intervention in the internal or external affairs of any state;4 a
basic tenet of diplomatic and consular practice.' Intervention has been
defined as the dictatorial interference by one state in the affairs of
another for the purpose of maintaining or changing the existing order
of things.' One writer, Van Glahn, contends that the only exceptions
are (a) intervention by right for the protection of a state's territory;
(b) if the foreign relations of one state endangers the external affairs
of another; (c) if a state violates the rules of international law, e.g,
the belligerent violation of the rights of a neutral state; (d) (more
debatable)-if the citizens of one state are mistreated in another, e.g.,
the United States intervention in Nicaragua in 1909; (e) where there
is lawful intervention by the collective action of an international
organization; (f) and at the invitation of another state. He does not
regard humanitation intervention as lawful, questioning whether the
ends justify the means and whether such interventions were motivated
by selfless aims.7
Waldock, however, contends that intervention, being a violation
of another state's independence, was recognized to be, in principle,
contrary to international law so that any act of intervention had to
be justified as a legitimate case of reprisal, protection of nationals
abroad, self defense, or alternatively, pursuant to a treaty with the
state concerned.' Aside from special treaty rights, intervention was
not so much a right as a sanction against a wrong or threatened
wrong.
WALDOCK: In strict theory, the legality of an interven-
tion by many states acting together had to be judged by
the same tests as that of an intervention by a single state,
but politically and morally the distinction might sometimes
be vital. On many occasions in the nineteenth century, the
2. Id.
3. See, Feinberg, supra note 1; WINFIELD, BRIT. YR. BKL OF INTL. LAW 161
(1924).
4. G. VON GLAHN, LAW AMONG NATIONS 159 (1965).
5. See, e.g., STUART, AMERICAN DIPLOMATIC AND CONSULAR PRACTICE 196-97
(1952).
6. Van Glahn, supra note 4.
7. Id.
8. H. WALDOCK, LAW OF NATIONS 402-03 (Brierly 6th ed. 1963).
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Great Powers intervened, by action which technically and
legally involved a usurpation of power, in order to impose
the settlement of a question which threatened the peace
of Europe. In the absence of an effective international pro-
cedure for altering international conditions, such extra-legal
action was sometimes the only practical alternative to war;
but, lacking any constitutional authority, its basis was sheer
power rather than law. Some support was, however, found
among jurists for the view that humanitarian intervention
by a number of Powers to prevent a state from committing
atrocities against its own subjects or suppressing religious
liberties, such as several times happened in the nineteenth
century, was recognized by international law. Whether this
really was so is doubtful in view of the strength in that
period of the principle that a state's treatment of its own
subjects was a matter exclusively within its own domestic
jurisdiction?
One writer has characterized humanitarian intervention as "an extraor-
dinary remedy, an exception to the postulates of state sovereignty
and territorial inviolability which are fundamental to the traditional
theory if not actual practice of international law."'1 These writers
(scholar jurists) regard the doctrine of humanitarian intervention as
based not on the "nation-state oriented theories of international law"
but upon "an antinomic but equally vigorous principle, deriving from
a long tradition of natural law and secular values: the kinship and
minimum reciprocal responsibilities of all humanity, the inability of
geographical boundaries to stem categorical moral imperatives, and
ultimately, the confirmation of sanctity of human life, without reference
to place or transient circumstances."
Legal scholars supporting the doctrine of humanitarian interven-
tion, whether from a natural law or analytical jurisprudential perspec-
tive, regard humanitarian intervention as the ultimate sanction of in-
ternational law to protect a minimum standard of human rights.2 The
sovereignty or jurisdictional exclusivity of the nation state was condi-
tional upon a respect of these minimum human rights which Professor
9. Id. at 403.
10. REISMAN, MEMORANDUM UPON HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION TO PROTECT THE
IBOS (1968). See also Reisman, Making International Law Effective: The Case for Civic En-
forcement in THE UNITED NATIONS, A REASSESSMENT (J. Paxman & Cr. Boggs, eds. 1973)
and HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION AND THE UNITED NATIONS, (R. Lillich, ed. 1973).
11. Reisman, supra note 10.
12. Id.
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Bourgier characterized as le droit humain,3 a doctrine asserted con-
sistently by others such as Grotius"' and Vattel." Borchard in concep-
tualizing this doctrine asserted that:
•. where a state under exceptional circumstances disregards
certain rights of its own citizens over whom presumably
it has absolute sovereignty, the other states of the family
of nations are authorized by international law to intervene
on grounds of humanity. When these 'human' rights are
habitually violated, one or more states may intervene in
the name of the society of nations and may take such
measures as to substitute at least temporarily, if not per-
manently, its own sovereignty for that of the state thus
controlled. Whatever the origin therefore, of the rights of
the individual, it deems assured that these essential rights
rest upon the ultimate sanction of international law, and
will be protected, in the last resort, by the most appropriate
organ of the international community."6
Oppenheim, in 1905, summarized international law practice with
regard to humanitarian intervention:
• . .should a state venture to treat its own subjects or a
part thereof with such cruelty as would stagger humanity,
public opinion of the rest of the world would call upon the
Powers to exercise intervention for the purpose of compel-
ling such states to establish a legal order of things within
its boundaries sufficient to guarantee to its citizens more
adequate to the ideas of modern civilization. 7
Sir Herch (later Judge) Lauterpacht, in editing a recent edition
of Oppenheimer's text in international law, observed:
There is general agreement that, by virtue of its personal
and territorial supremacy, a state can treat its own nationals
according to discretion. But there is a substantial body of
opinion and of practice in support of the view that there
are limits to that discretion and that when a state renders
itself guilty of cruelties against and persecution of its na-
13. Rougier, La Theorie de l'intervention d'humanite, in REVUE GENERALE DE
DROIT INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC 516 (1910).
14. H. GROTIUS, THE RIGHTS OF WAR AND PEACE 285-84 (1901).
15. E. de Vattel, Le Droit des Gens, PRINCIPES DE LE LOI NATURALIS.
16. BORCHARD, THE DIPLOMATIC PROTECTION OF CITIZENS ABROAD 14 (1922).
17. OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW 347 (1905).
19841
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tionals in such a way as to deny their fundamental human
rights and to shock the conscience of mankind, interven-
tion in the interest of humanity is legally permissible.'
Lauterpacht has, however, written elsewhere that "the doctrine
of humanitarian intervention has never become a fully acknowledged
part of international law,"" a view not universally held."°
In the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, the doctrine of
humanitarian intervention was based on religious grounds. Vittoria
(1480-1546), the Spanish Dominican, contended that the heathen princes
were legitimate, but argued that resistance by them to the Christian
missionaries and measures to force converted Indians to return to
paganism would entitle the Pope to depose the Indian princes to be
replaced by Christians and justified war.2 Religion was, until the Peace
of Westphalia, the ideological basis for intervention. Subsequently,
religion no longer remained as a basis in Western Europe but did
remain so in Eastern Europe. Catherine, for example, justified in-
tervention in Poland and Turkey on religious grounds. In the 19th
century, western powers intervened on behalf of the Ottoman Em-
pire with whom they shared a common faith. Secularization of religious
belief led to basing such intervention on behalf of the dignity of man.'2
Humanitarian intervention, as practiced in the 18th and 19th cen-
turies was concerned primarily with the rights of Jews and Chris-
tians and other minorities in Eastern Europe and the Ottoman Em-
pire. It was generally exercised through diplomatic channels and
played a part in international congresses and conferences. Though
there were instances of military intervention, in most instances
humanitarian intervention was confined to diplomatic protest and took
the form of diplomatic intercession. In many instances, particularly
with regard to the interventions in the Ottoman Empire, interven-
tion may well have been motivated not entirely be selfless goals. The
intercessions on behalf of the Jews were generally prompted by
idealistic considerations.
The principle of international protection of the Jews was stated
by Edmund Burke in a speech in Parliament in 1781.
18. OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW 279 (H. Lauterpacht, 7th ed. 1948).
19. Lauterpacht, The Grotian Tradition in International Law, 23 BRIT. YR. BK.
OF INT'L LAW 46 (1946).
20. C. de VISSCHER, THEORIES ET REALITIES EN DROIT INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC
219-21 (1950).
21. J. SCOTT, 1 SPANISH ORIGINS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (1934).
22. Green, General Principles of Law and Human Rights, 8 CURRENT LEGAL
PROBLEMS 162 (1955-56).
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Having no fixed settlement in any part of the world, no
kingdom nor country in which they have a government, a
community nor a system of laws, they are thrown upon the
benevolence of nations . . . If Dutchmen are injured and
attacked, the Dutch have a nation, a government and ar-
mies to redress or revenge their cause. If Britains are in-
jured, Britains have armies and laws, the law of nations
• . . to fly for protection and justice. But the Jews have
no such power and no such friend to depend on. Humanity,
then, must be their protection and ally.2"
In 1867, the British representative in a dispatch to the Rumanian
Government stated: "The peculiar position of the Jews place them
under the protection of the civilized world."24
These principles were reflected in treaties adopted during the
18th century which protected the Jews and other minorities. This
tradition for the protection of minorities in European peace treaties
has prevailed for over 300 years. Almost without exception, major
peace treaties involving changes of sovereignty contained clauses
safeguarding the rights and properties of populations transferred to
new sovereignties." For example, the Berlin Treaty of 1878 bound
Bulgaria, Montenegro, Serbia and Rumania to respect the principle
that "differences of religion, creeds and confessions shall not be alleged
against any person as a ground for exclusion or incapacity in matters
relating to the enjoyment of civil and political rights."' A similar pro-
vision had previously been incorporated in the treaties resulting from
the Congress of Vienna. The doctrine of humanitarian intervention
that was involved within the context of these treaty provisions and
which also encompassed protection of the Jews, became a part of
diplomatic practice.
Occasionally this intervention took the form of counselor protec-
tion as when the British and other Counsels during the 19th century
protected the rights of Jews and Christians in Jerusalem; though this
action was also prompted by political considerations. For instance,
23. BURKE, 13 PARLIAMENTARY HISTORY OF ENGLAND FROM THE EARLIEST PERIOD
TO THE YEAR 1803 (1814); Feinberg, supra note 1.
24. Feinberg, supra note 1.
25. Id.
26. Robinson, From Protection of Minorities to Protection of Human Rights,
1 JEWISH YR. BK. OF HUMAN RIGHTS 115 (1948).
27. Rabinowitz, The British Connection, Aug. 13, 1973 (Special Anglo-Israel
Supplement); Chapiro, THE COUNCIL OF JEWISH MESSENGERS OF THE JEWS OF AMERICA,
4-3 (76-77) Gesher 128, 148, Dec. 1973 (In Hebrew).
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in 1870 President Grant appointed Benjamin Peixatto, a Jew and
leader of the Bnai Brith Order as Counsel in Rumania for the pur-
pose of protecting the Jewish population. In a letter of introduction
for Prince Charles, ruler of Rumania, the President stated that Peixatto
"has undertaken the duties of his present office more as a missionary
work for the people he represents than for any benefit to occur to
himself."' His duties relating to human intervention is not an exclusive
examplar of such acts.
Another innovative example of United States intervention on
behalf of Rumanian Jews occurred in 1902 when Secretary of State
John Hay sent a note to the American Counsel in Athens, who was
then negotiating a naturalization treaty with Rumania, which was in
effect an indictment of that Government's policy towards its Jewish
population. Though the United States was not a party to the treaty
of Berlin of 1873, copies of the note were sent to the states which
were a party to the treaty-Great Britain, France, Russia, Germany,
Austro-Hungary, Italy and Turkey-to induce them to take whatever
steps might be necessary to pressure Rumania to fulfill the obligations
which it had undertaken under the Treaty of Berlin, though the United
States itself was not a party to the treaty.29
Because humanitarian intervention was not accepted universally
at the time and because the United States felt it proper to base its
protest not only on humanitarian grounds but also on the contention
that:
"the unbearable situation of the Rumanian Jews was driving
them to abandon their native country, with the result that
multitudes of paupers and outcasts were reaching the shores
of America and, since they left their homes not of their own
28. Feinberg, supra note 1. In 1840, During the Van Buren administration,
Secretary Forsyth reported to Jewish community leaders that he had directed the
American counsel in Alexandria to intervene on behalf of Jews who were being
persecuted in Damascus as a result of a ritual blood libel. J. Ezekiel, Prosecution of
the Jews in 1840, 3 THE JEWISH EXPERIENCE IN AMERICA 267-69 (1969). In 1869 Secretary
of State Hamilton Fish was hesitant to interfere with regard to a threatened deporta-
tion of Jews from Bessarbia by Czarist authorities. Greenberg, An 1869 Petition on
Behalf of Russian Jews, 3 THE JEWISH EXPERIENCE IN AMERICA 167-69 (1969). In 1869
Secretary of State Hamilton Fish was hesitant to interfere with regard to a threatened
deportation of Jews from Bessarabia by Czarist authorities. Greenberg, An 1869 Peti-
tion on Behalf of Russian Jews, 3 THE JEWISH EXPERIENCE IN AMERICA 353-70 (1969); see
also Shapiro, supra note 27.
29. Feinberg, supra note 1; Fartner, Counsel Peixotto in Bucharest, AM. JEWISH
HISTORICAL QUARTERLY 25-117 (Sept. 1968).
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free will but because of the oppression suffered by them
there, their migration lacks the essential conditions which
make alien immigration either acceptable or beneficial."'
The article stated further that "the United States offers asylum
to the oppressed of all lands. But its sympathy with them in no wise
impairs its just liberty and right to weigh the acts of the oppressor
in the light of their effects upon this country . . . " and stressed that
"this Government cannot be a tacit party to such an inter-
national wrong. It is constrained to protest against the treat-
ment to which the Jews in Rumania are subjected, not alone
because it has unimpeachable ground to remonstrate against
the resultant injury to itself, but in the name of humanity.
The United States may not authoritatively appeal to the
stimulations of the treaty of Berlin .... but it does earnestly
appeal to the principles consigned therein, because they are
the principles of international law and eternal justice... "'
The United States had previously stated as to Rumanian Jews
that:
"the wrong in question is so flagrant and of such a universal
and cosmopolitan character that all governments and faiths
have an interest in demanding that it be recessed." 2
In the 20th century, the American State Department protested against
the persecution of the Jews in Czarist Russia. During the administra-
tion of Theodore Roosevelt, a petition of Jews and other Americans
was forwarded by the State Department to the Czarist regime ex-
pressing opposition to persecution. Though the Czarist Government
refused to accept the petition, the act in itself was a significant
gesture.'
In 1913, the Congress of the United States revoked the Russian-
American Treaty of Commerce of 1832 in reaction to the Kishinev
pogroms, and over the Czarist exclusion of American Jews, a prece-
dent for the contemporary Jackson amendment. However, the failure
to intervene or intercede on behalf of the Jews of Germany in the
1930's and the Jews of Europe in the 1940's in the face of the Nazi
genocide remains a blot on the conscience of mankind.
30. Feinberg, supra note 1.
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Id.; L. WOLF, THE LEGAL SUFFERINGS OF THE JEWS IN RUSSIA (1912).
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Humanitarian intervention was, similarly, invoked with regard
to mistreatment of Christians and Jews in the Ottoman Empire,
though power politics was also involved. Great Britain, France and
Russia, for example, intervened militarily in Greece, resulting in the
independence of the country in 1830, with the action justified on the
grounds of humanity.' Turkish massacres of Christians in Syria pro-
vided a basis for the French to intervene militarily on the basis of
a protocol issued at the conference of Paris, attended by Austria,
France, Great Britain, Prussia, Russia and Turkey.35 The intervention
resulted in the writing of a constitution for Lebanon, providing for
a Christian governor, responsible to the Portes 6
Similarly, when Crete revolted in 1866, alleging Turkish misrule
and persecution of Christians; Austria, France, Italy, Prussia and
Russia called for the establishment of an International Commission
of Inquiry to conduct a fact finding exploration into the allegations.
Turkey refused, claiming that the matter was one of domestic jurisdic-
tion. To avoid military intervention, Britain interposed as a neutral
mediator, proffering friendly advice to Turkey. The Turkish govern-
ment responded by promulgating a constitution deemed acceptable
to the Christian population and made commitments for the protection
of human rights. 7
Alleged mistreatment of the Christian populations in Bosnia, Her-
zigovina, and Bulgaria resulted in intervention by Austria-Hungary,
France, Germany, Great Britain, Italy and Russia who insisted on a
conference with Turkey. The powers demanded that an international
commission operate in the areas to observe and protect the
Christians.' When Turkey rejected the proposal, the powers convened,
without the Porte, in London, and agreed on a protocol reserving to
themselves a right of action if Turkey failed to maintain certain
minimum conditions. Turkey rejected the protocol, and Russia waged
war. By the treaty of San Stefano and the Congress of Berlin of 1878,
a system of Christian autonomy was established for Bulgaria and
Montenegro, Serbia and Rumania were made independent, and Bosnia
and Herzegovina were occupied and annexed by the Dual Monarchy
of Austria-Hungary.
34. Reisman, supra note 10, at 19; GANJI, INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION OF HUMAN
RIGHTS (1962).
35. 51 BRITISH AND FOREIGN STATE PAPERS 292.
36. Id. at 268-92.
37. Ganji, supra note 34, at 26-27.
38. 68 BRITISH AND FOREIGN STATE PAPERS 823, 1114; 69 BRITISH AND FOREIGN
STATE PAPERS 749.
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Though the Treaty of Berlin provided for protection of the rights
of minorities, the annexations increased international tension in the
Balkans and was one of the factors which led to World War I. Riesman
regards the humanitarian intervention in this instance as having been
defective in that there was a "lack of inclusive supervision of its terms,
facilitating abuse (with partial but not maximum alleviation of the sub-
ject peoples in question) by one of the intervening powers."39 However,
he contends that the case does not undercut the authority of
humanitarian intervention, but does "suggest that structural and func-
tional checks upon an intervention can anticipate and prevent the
possibility of abuse."4
Another instance of intervention in the Ottoman Empire occurred
in 1903 when, in the course of a rebellion in Macedonia, Turkish troops
attacked the civilian population and destroyed many villages. Acting
on behalf of the European powers, Austria-Hungary and Russia
demanded that the Sultan provide for the Future protection of the
population in accordance with certain procedures and that a year's
taxes be remitted as reparation.4' Turkey accepted the demands, but
the subsequent revolution within Turkey led to the perpetration of
new atrocities and was in part a factor leading to a declaration of
war by Greece, Bulgaria and Serbia."' The doctrine of human interven-
tion has had further implications than those previewed.
The United States' policy on humanitarian intervention was in-
fluenced by the British. In 1877, the Department of State stated that
it could not render a protest on humanitarian grounds without the
permission of the government in question.4 A year later, however,
upon a request to protest mistreatment of Jews in Barbary, the
Department of State stated in a directive to its counsel that "...
there might be cases in which humanity would dictate a disregard
of technicalities, if your personal influence would shield Hebrews from
oppression."" Shortly thereafter the consul of Tangiers was instructed
that he was at liberty to act in such cases ". . . so far as many be
consistent with his international obligations, and the efficiency of his
official relations with the Schariffian Government.'
The United States intervention in the Cuban rebellion against
39. Reisman, supra note 10, at 23-24.
40. Id.
41. Ganji, supra note 34, at 36-37.
42. Id.
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the Spanish Monarchy was based in part on the doctrine of humani-
tarian intervention. The sanguinary insurrections in Cuba during the
latter part and end of the nineteenth century vexed the United
States."6 The insurrection of 1868-78 concerned the United States
because of suppressive measures taken against American naturalized
citizens with Cuban names and insurrectionary habits, and because
of the problem of policing American territorial waters to prevent the
departure of hostile expeditions against a friendly power. In 1869,
President Grant, through Secretary of State Hamilton Fish, offered
the good offices of the United States to Spain for settling the conflict
on the basis of abolition of slavery and Cuban independence in ex-
change for an indemnity to Spain, the payment of which was to be
guaranteed by the United States. Spain refused to consider peace
unless the insurgents surrendered. However, it did feel constrained
to recognize the right of the naturalized American citizens to their
status and to full protection from arbitrary military tribunals- unless
captured with arms in their hands-in accordance with the Pickney
Treaty of 1795 and a protocol thereto of January 12, 1877. An agree-
ment was reached to adjudicate claims of American citizens before
a mixed claims tribunal. The United States refrained from recognizing
Cuba's belligerency, despite pressures from Congress. This position
strengthened the United States' legal position when a fillibustering
ship, the Virginius, fraudulently-as later proved-flying an American
flag, was seized by Spanish authorities who summarily, after a nominal
court-martial, executed 53 of its passengers and crew. After the United
States issued an ultimatum, Spain restored the ship and paid an indem-
nity of $80,000 to be distributed to the families of the persons ex-
ecuted. Promises to punish the Spanish officers involved in the seizure
and executions were not fulfilled. Spain also paid an indemnity to
Great Britain for nineteen British subjects who were also executed.
Though incidents of embargo and confiscation continued, the United
States refrained from intervening.
Fish sought the help of the European powers in resolving the
conflict. He sought British cooperation and dispatched a note to
Minister Caleb Cushing to be presented to the Spanish Minister of
Foreign Affairs, expressing the determination of the President that
means be found to restore peace to Cuba on the basis of emancipa-
tion and self government. Other European powers were also asked
to intercede with the Spanish Government. Fish was criticized for
46. S. BEMIS, A DIPLOMATIC HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES 432-50 (6th ed.
1965).
47. Id.
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jeopardizing the Monroe Doctrine by inviting European cooperation
to solve an American question. This approach had been unprecedented
and was never again undertaken. The European powers, concerned
with their own problems at the time, only interceded and did not
undertake any active intervention. The conflict ended after Spain
finally was able to supress the rebellion.
The revolt flared anew in 1895. The Cuban revolutionists sought
to break the Spanish rule by methodically destroying the sugar plan-
tations and cattle ranches via funds and support received from juntas
of compatriots organized in the United States and other countries who
themselves attempted hostile actions from United States territorial
waters, violating the neutrality laws. Spain, under the guidance of
General Weyler, reconcentrated the civilian population, treating all
outside the concentration camps as rebels. With no sanitation, the
civilian reconcentrados of the camps suffered deprivations and many
died. The property and persons of American citizens domiciled in Cuba
were arbitrarily interfered with by the Rebels. President Cleveland
and Secretary of State Olney asserted the protection of the rights
of American citizens in accordance with treaty rights while interceding
with Spain to accept American mediation to end the conflict. Cleveland,
however, resisted Congressional pressure to intervene to free Cuba.
He proposed to cooperate with Spain to bring peace to Cuba on the
basis of home rule which he coupled with an assurance against any
design on Spanish sovereignty. The Spanish Cabinet declined the offer,
distrusting American intentions. Prior to leaving office in 1896,
Cleveland warned that a situation could arise "in which our obligations
to the sovereignty of Spain will be superseded by higher obligations,
which we can hardly hesitate to recognize and discharge." 8
McKinley, like Grant and Cleveland, offered his good offices
which were declined by Spain. Spain, meanwhile, introduced reform
measures and removed General Weyler. The home rule measures were
opposed by the Spaniards living in Cuba and by the revolutionists.
McKinley, however, declared that he would allow time to test Spanish
sincerity. But there was the persistent spectacle of human suffering
close to American shores which were made vivid by the journalism
of the time which whipped up public passions. Political leaders were
stressing America's "Manifest Destiny". Public sentiment was aroused
by the blowing up of the American battle ship, the Maine, in Havana
harbor. Spain offered to arbitrate matters arising from the incident
and agreed to proclaim an armistice. The European governments
48. Id at 440.
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sought to mediate. The foreign minister of Austria-Hungary secured
the approval of Great Britain, Germany, France, Italy, Austria-
Hungary and Russia to a joint note which was presented to Presi-
dent McKinley stating that they hoped for humanity's sake the Cuban
question could be solved peaceably. McKinley stated that he agreed,
but that if the United States did intervene, it would be for humanity's
sake. The Congress forced the President to intervene by passing a
joint resolution authorizing military action but also disclaimed any
intention to exercise sovereignty, jurisdiction or control over Cuba
except for its pacification and to then leave the government and con-
trol to the Cubans."9 McKinley signed the joint resolution in 1898 and
conveyed an ultimatum to Spain, as expressed in the resolution that
Cuba be independent, that Spain withdraw from the island, and that
the President was empowered to take military measures to put the
resolution into effect. Spain refused to accept the ultimatum and chose
war. Congress declared that a state of war had been in existence and
the President proclaimed a blockade of the north coast of Cuba and
the Port of Santiago.
After the Spanish forces were defeated, a constitutional conven-
tion was convened and within two years the Cuban Republic was
created. However, the United States continued to intervene in the
domestic affairs of Cuba. In 1901 Congress enacted the Platt Amend-
ment which gave the United States the right to intervene "for the
preservation of Cuban independence, the maintenance of a govern-
ment adequate for the protection of life, property and individual
liberty" and for discharging the obligations by the Treaty of Paris.-
The effect of the Amendment was to make Cuba a protectorate of
the Untied States. The Cubans were required to accept it as a condi-
tion for United States evacuation following the end of the Spanish-
American War. The terms were embodied both in a treaty with the
United States and in the Cuban Constitution. The Amendment and
the protectorate status was later abolished during the administration
of Franklin D. Roosevelt by treaty in 1934.1'
The principles of humanitarian intervention, as manifested in in-
ternational practice were institutionalized following World War I in
the treaties protesting the rights of minorities. These treaties
represented a continuation of a more than 300 year old tradition of
protecting religious and national minorities."2 Jewish groups at the
49. Id. at 449.
50. Id. at 504-05.
51. Id. at 505-06.
52. Robinson, supra note 26; 1 OPPENHEIM's INTERNATIONAL LAW 650-56 (Lauter-
pacht, 7th ed 1948).
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Paris Peace Conference played a significant role in the adoption of
these treaties.' The treaties applied to the emerging states of eastern
Europe, the defeated powers of Austria, Hungary, Bulgaria and
Turkey, and also to victorious states, Poland, Yugoslavia, Greece and
Czechoslovakia and to Lithuainia, Latvia, Estonia and Albania. But
the treaties did not apply to the major powers. Adherence to the prin-
ciple of protecting rights of minorities was a condition for sovereignty
and state-hood. The minorities treaties provided for the protection
of life and liberty and free expression of religion for all inhabitants,
and for certain inhabitants automatic, or at least facilities for acquisi-
tion of citizenship. For national groups, it provided equality before
the law as to political and civil rights and as to the use of any language
which the Permanent Court of International Justice interpreted to
be in fact, as well as in law; freedom of organization for religious
and national purposes and state provision for the elementary instruc-
tion of their children through the medium of their own language.'
Enforcement by the contracting states was undertaken by treaty
stipulations which recognized the principle clauses as fundamental law
and an undertaking that no law, regulation or official act shall con-
flict or interfere with the treaty principles. The treaty clauses consti-
tuted "obligations of international concern" and were placed under
the guarantee of the League of Nations and could be modified only
with the consent of a majority of the League Council. Any member
could present a complaint as to an infraction before the Council to
be regarded as a dispute of an international character. Disputes
relating to treaty interpretation were referrable to the Permanent
Court of International Justice. A procedure was established by which
complaints by individuals and groups could be submitted with the
League Secretariat establishing a minorities section. The minorities
system broke down in the 1930's with the general break down of the
League and international order. However, the minorities system rep-
resented a precedent in extending the fundamental rights of the in-
dividual under international law. It represented a significant advance
from the doctrine of humanitarian intervention.
As Lauterpacht observed, the basing of human rights on human-
itarian intervention was a "precarious doctrine."" It was honored more
in theory than in practice. Governments saw a conflict between the
defense of human rights through external intervention and considera-
tions of international peace created by such intervention. There is
53. Robinson, supra note 26.
54. Robinson, supra note 26; Lauterpacht, supra note 52.
55. LAUTERPACHT, INTERNATIONAL LAW ON HUMAN RIGHTS 31-32 (1958).
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also the view that such intervention, far from protecting victims pro-
duces contrary vices, contrary to expectations. However, the fury of
persecution receives an impetus not only from foreign acquiescence
but also from the hesitation and reserve of foreign intervention coupled
with the courteous advice that there is no right of intercession. The
infrequency and sporadic use of humanitarian intervention makes it
hardly a rule of international law. Britain, for example, failed to pro-
tect British Jews in Czarist Russia, claiming they had no legal claim
to be treated differently." The attitude of the United States was
different."
In the 1920's and 30's, there was a backsliding of international
concern for human rights as nations refrained from intervening. Most
shocking was the failure to intercede or take any action on behalf
of the Jews murdered by the Nazis. The role of the Roosevelt admin-
istration and the United States Department of State in refusing to
aid refugees and in inhibiting public recognition of the holocaust were
well documented.' The allies in World War II refused to recognize
the Jews as a distinctive victim. The United States refused to
recognize the victims of the extermination camps as prisoners of war,
a step which would have saved many thousands. The State Depart-
ment refused efforts for recertification or to allow immigration. This
reluctance was based on several factors.
Among the reasons for failure to intervene was the failure of
American Jews to form an effective constituency of support. One
group, the American Jewish Committee, stressed the well mannered
approach of the dignified letter to government leaders followed by
interviews. Though the Committee had been effective during the Taft
and Wilson administrations in instigating American support for Jewish
rights in Eastern Europe, it failed to understand the difference be-
tween the Nazis and previous persecutions at the time when German
Jews appealed to it when Hitler first came to power. They were
cautious, fearing imprudent action would strengthen pro-Nazi senti-
ment inside Germany. Another group, the American Jewish Congress,
had a more militant style which included boycotts. Both groups, believ-
ing in the melting pot, relied on a normative appeal to American tradi-
tion, ideals and defense of human rights. Each looked on Roosevelt
as their benevolent patron. However, the Jewish voters' solid sup-
port for the President was never used as a resource for bargaining.
56. MCNAIR, LAW OF TREATIES 250-51 (1938).
57. Lauterpacht, supra note 55.
58. Morse, While Six Million Died (1968): Feingold, The Politics of Rescue;
THE ROOSEVELT ADMINISTRATION AND THE HOLOCAUST (1980).
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He was seen as the enemy of their enemies, who in turn berated him
for supposedly identifying with the Jews."
Antisemites, representing the elite and the mass, castigated FDR
publicly and privately by labelling his administration a "Jew Deal"
and pejorative epithets against Franklin and Eleanor were circulated
among the White Anglo Saxon Protestant (WASP) social elite from
which Roosevelt originated. The State Department was believed to
be largely staffed by this elite. Roosevelt's sensitivity to rejection
by the WASP elite reinforced his political calculation that agreeing
to Jewish appeals which aroused Congressional and State Department
opposition was not prudent. Opposed to the advocates of rescue dur-
ing the pre-World War II years were numerous native fascist, patriotic
veterans, and anti-immigration groups of diverse interest.
The President was thus confronted with a readily resolvable
role conflict: on one side a miniscule, but strategically
situated, ally who escalated exhortation, but never would
emply any sanctions; on the other, a consensus of elite,
ideological and interest groups, and political managers
speaking (accurately) in the name of the majority, all of
whom wanted to check any measures to open up the gates
to more refugees. Roosevelt yielded without demurer to the
party which threatened sanctions for non-performance
without incurring any costs from failing to satisfy the Jews;
he had discovered that they were readily placated by sym-
bolic reassurances. Since both parties could claim they
represented legitimate values, one might justify either
policy; while Jewish leaders spoke in the name of humani-
ty, State Department officials spoke in the name of the law-
itself reinforced by public consenses against immigration-
and security."
The case indicates that "No group has any basis to expect in-
tervention from another nation-state if the nation harboring it wars
against its right to exist unless there is a constituency on the vic-
tim's behalf mobilized in a more powerful nation."" Where such a con-
stituency does not exist or does not effectively exert its influence,
as with regard to the slaughter of ethnic groups in Pakistan, Cam-
bodia, Nigeria and Burundi, or the mass political suppression in In-
donesia and Chile or the suppressions in Northern Ireland, indifference
59. Fein, Toleration of Genocide, 7 PATTERNS OF PREJUDICE 22 (Sept.-Oct. 1973).
60. Id. at 27.
61. Id. at 28.
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or mere token hypocritical rhetoric of disapproval has been elicited
by the United States and other powers. However, the United States
has intervened to secure the right of immigration for the Jews from
the Soviet Union because of the concerted drive of American Jewish
groups on their behalf with support elicited from both political par-
ties. Had the Jews been more assertive of their particular rights in
the 1930's, as were the Negroes who threatened a march on
Washington to demand job equality, they probably would have been
more successful. The assumption of submerging particularistic to
universal claims under the "melting pot theory" was rejected in the
1960's as set by the precedent of the black movement for collective
self assertion. As a result, recrudescence of ethnic consciousness has
emerged in the United States and elsewhere.
Though allied declarations during World War II refrained from
condemning the Nazi genocide against the Jews, the Four Freedoms
Declaration by Franklin D. Roosevelt in January, 1941, the Atlantic
Charter Declaration by Roosevelt and Churchill of August, 1941, and
the Declaration of the United Nations of January 1942, established
the protection of human rights as an objective of the war in response
to the trampling of human dignity by the Axis powers. These pro-
nouncements were first implemented by the Nuremberg Charter of
1945 which set up the International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg.
In 1946, the General Assembly of the United Nations unanimously
affirmed "the principles of international law recognized by the Charter
of the Nuremberg Tribunal and the judgment of the Tribunal." 2 The
significance of the Nuremberg trials was (a) in fixing individual respon-
sibility for acts against humanity which thereby constituted a deter-
rent in that the argument of Act of State may no longer be asserted
as a defense; (b) it revealed the nation of criminality toward mankind;
(c) it influenced municipal legislation; (d) influenced the drafting of
the United Nations Charter and led to the adoption by the General
Assembly of the Declaration of Human Rights. 8 Due to these efforts,
all civilized states now have a very real interest in the punishment
of war crimes.64 An effect of the Nuremberg trials was the adoption
by the General Assembly in 1946 of the Genocide Convention. The
International Court of Justice interpreted the punishment of Genocide
62. 1 U.N. GAOR 1144 (1946); Finch, The Nuremberg Trial, 41 AM. J. INTL. L.
20 (1947).
63. Baisky, Twenty-Five Years After the Nuremberg War Tribunal Trials, 23
HAPRAKLIT 69 (1971).
64. Cowles, Jurisdiction Over War Crimes, 33 CAL. L. REV. 217 (1945). Kutner,
Due Process of War: An Ad Hoc Crimes Tribunal: A Proposal, 43 NOTRE DAME LAW
481 (1968).
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under the Convention as a matter of international concern and that
the Convention was intended to be universal in scope."
The United Nations Charter, the Universal Declaration on Human
Rights and other United Nations Covenants and Declarations have
established a framework for the protection of fundamental human
rights. Machinery was established by way of the Human Rights Com-
mission as part of the Economic and Social Council and through discus-
sion in the General Assembly which has assumed the role previously
undertaken by the practice of humanitarian intervention. The pream-
ble of the Charter asserts the task of the United Nations as reaffir-
mation of faith "in fundamental human rights in dignity and worth
of the human person, in the equal rights of men and women, and of
nations large and small" while article 1, paragraph 3 declares that
one of the purposes of the United Nations is to achieve ". . . interna-
tional cooperation in solving international problems of an economic,
social, cultural, or humanitarian character and in promoting and en-
couraging respect for and observance of human rights and fundamen-
tal freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language or
religion." When this is coupled with Article 56 which states that "all
members pledge themselves to take joint and separate action in
cooperation with the organization for the achievement of the purposes
set forth in Article 55 (a)," some text writers have contended that
member states are obliged to protect the fundamental rights of their
subjects."
Article 2, paragraph 7 of the Charter which precludes the United
Nations from interfering in matters which are "essentially within the
domestic jurisdiction of any state" may not be interposed because the
member states have obliged themselves to promote fundamental
human rights. 7 Moreover, intervention does not include studies and
resolution." The argument may also be made that in a situation where
there is a denial of human rights, a threat to world peace arises, as
with regard to apartheid practices in South Africa so that the matter
65. International Court of Justice Report, "Reservation of the Convention of
the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide," Advisory Opinion. Baisky,
Twenty-Five Years After the Nuremberg War Tribunal Trials, 22 HAPRAKLIT 491 (1970).
66. Lauterpacht, Human Rights, The Charter of the United Nations and the
International Bill of Rights of Man, Ch. 11, U.N. Doc. E/CN 4/89 (1948); Ganji, supra
note 34, Chap. IV; CHAKRAVARTI, HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE UNITED NATIONS 47-51 (1958);
Metzger, The Nature and Extent of Legal Limitations Upon A Nation's Freedom of Ac-
tion, 1961 WIS. LAW REV. 277 (1961).
67. CASSIN, INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONS, IN WORLD VETERANS FEDERATION IN-
STITUTIONS FOR THE PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS 19 (1964).
68. Id.
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is no longer essentially within domestic jurisdiction. Today it is vir-
tually impossible to delineate matters of solely 'domestic' or solely
'international' concern. The political organ of the United Nations hardly
refrains from discussing any human rights issue which any member
puts on the agenda. 9
The meaning of "fundamental rights and human freedom" is
defined by the Universal Declaration of Human Rights which expresses
a common standard of action for their promotion. Though the Declara-
tion may not originally have been intended to have binding effect,
its adoption by the unanimous vote of all the delegations, though with
Russian abstention, its invocation in subsequent General Assembly
resolutions and its incorporation in the constitutions of many states,
have made it a part of customary international law. The Universal
Declaration has become the yardstick for measuring the progress of
governments and peoples in their struggles for freedom and dignity.
It helped stimulate the 1950 European Convention for the Protection
of Human Rights and the Draft Inter-American Convention on human
rights, and influenced the Bill of Rights formulations of post World
War II Constitutions. It has become a basic norm in the development
of human rights law and the working outline for international
conventions.7" Oppressed groups invoke the Declaration in seeking in-
ternational intercession in their behalf.
In addition to the Genocide Convention, a series of international
conventions dealing with human rights has been adopted since World
War II, including the rights of refugees, stateless persons, the political
rights of women, the nationality of married women and slavery. Also
in force are ILO Conventions on forced labor and discrimination in
employment and a UNESCO Convention on discrimination in educa-
tion. The United Nations has adopted the Convention on the Preven-
tion of Racial Discrimination and Covenants for the Protection of
Political and Civil Rights. Single purpose Conventions have been
adopted dealing with slavery, forced labor consent to marriage,
minimum ages of marriage, reduction to statelessness, and the inter-
national right to transmit news.7 The convention has also had local
effect.
Regionally, the European Convention on Human Rights provides
for the protection of human rights in Western Europe. The Conven-
tion establishes the European Convention on Human Rights and a
69. Henkin, The United Nations and Human Rights, 19 INTL. ORG. 504 (1965).
70. GARDNER, IN PURSUIT OF WORLD ORDER 241-42 (1964).
71. Id. at 242.
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European Court of Human Rights. Individuals and states may peti-
tion the Commission.72 Most significant is its theoretical extension of
the rights of individual petition. An individual who had been denied
his rights may, after the exhaustion of all domestic remedies, apply
to the Commission which will examine the matter and seek to resolve
the issue by conciliation. It may issue a report and then refer the
matter to the Court which may also hear matters referred to it by
a contracting party who had filed a complaint with the Commission,
or by a contracting party against whom an application had been filed.
Under the Convention, an individual may make application to the Com-
mission by presenting the case in person or by inducing a govern-
ment to act in his behalf. Though an individual may not present his
case before the court, he is permitted to communicate his views.
However, the Commission and the Court have been reluctant to act
on individual petitions, as demonstrated by the petition on behalf of
the detainees in Northern Ireland. The procrastination and interposed
technicalities of the Commission condemns the Commission and Court
as blind alleys in the human rights labyrinth.
The European Convention may be regarded as an institutionaliza-
tion of humanitarian intervention by purporting to provide for a
machinery for the initiation of complaints by contracting states.
However, it also represents an extension in allowing for individual
petition. When a contracting state files a complaint under the human
rights procedure, it in effect is acting to intervene humanitarily in
a case involving the violation of fundamental human rights, particularly
if its own national interest is not directly effected by the particular
incident. An example of such intervention was that by the Scandina-
vian countries in filing a petition pertaining to the suppression of
human rights by the Greek military regime.73 Greece withdrew before
being formally condemned as being a mongrel state in the family of
civilized nations. Other instances exist where human intervention has
abounded in suppressing particular interests.
The right to self-determination has become a basis for
humanitarian intervention in relation to remnants of colonialism as
expressed in United Nations declarations and in activities by the
United Nations and African states against apartheid in South Africa
and the white rule in Rhodesia. With the Declaration on Granting
72. Mashaw, Federal Issues In and About the Jurisdiction of the Court of Justice
of the European Communities, 40 TUL. L. REV. 21 (1965): McNair, The Expansion of In-
ternational Law, Hebrew University, Lionel Cohn Lecture (1961).
73. Buergenthal, Proceedings Against Greece Under the European Convention
of Human Rights, 62 AM. J. INTL. L. 441 (1968).
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of Independence to Colonial Peoples,74 the international proposition
has emerged that colonialism is an international wrong justifying the
right of intervention. Theories justifying intervention, other than the
doctrine of humanitarianism, have been advanced, e.g., the conten-
tion that colonialism is a form of aggression threatening national self
defense as in the case of India's invasion of Goal' and the right of
intervention on behalf of 'kith and kin', a concept adapted from the
right to intervene to protect nationals-as invoked by Egypt to justify
its intervention in Palestine in 1948 by claiming it was entering to
protect the Arab inhabitants with whom it claimed to have special
ties.76
The doctrine of 'kith and kin' has been invoked along with the
doctrine of humanitarian intervention as a trend has developed to
recognize the right to protect racial, religious or cultural 'kith and
kin', India has protested the maltreatment of people of Indian origin
in South Africa even though they were citizens of that state. A moral
obligation was also asserted. Similarly, in the Cyprus conflict, Greece
and Turkey claimed the right to protect those inhabitants related to
them by religious and cultural ties.
Another example was the Eichmann trial in which a nexus was
claimed between the Jewish people and the State of Israel. However,
it is doubtful if a right to intervene on the basis of 'kith and kin'
can be said to be encompassed by Article 51 of the United Nations
Charter and there is little support among writers for this concept.
The contention has been made that such intervention, like humani-
tarian intervention, may be regarded as a means for the protection
of human rights and the right to self-determination. It may be re-
garded as an extension of the right to protection of a state's nationals.77
The intervention must be solely for the purpose of protection and
once this is achieved, the intervening state is obliged to withdraw.
Another form of intervention, which may have humanitarian
74. G.A. RES 1514 (XV).
75. Dugard, The Organization of African Unity and Colonialism: An Enquiry
into the Plea of Self Defense as a Justification for the Use of Force in the Eradication
of Colonialism, 16 INTL. AND COMPL. L. Q. 157 (1967).
76. Id. Muslim jurists have maintained that a state could intervene in another
state in self defense and that a Muslim state could intervene in another Muslim state
to prevent an evil which would constitute something worse than the act of intervent-
ing such as the setting aside of some significant command of Islamic religious doc-
trine. MUHAMMAD HAMIDULLAH, MUSLIN CONDUCT OF STATE 85-86 (1953). Despite U.N.
norms, Egypt asserted the right to intervene in Yemen, another Arab state. Ossad,
Legal Aspects of the Egyptian Intervention in Yemen, 5 Is. L. REV. 216 (1970).
77. Dugard, supra note 75.
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aspects, entails the granting and withholding of recognition. 8 The term
"recognition" has been applied both to the recognition of governments
and of states. According to the constitutive doctrine, a state becomes
an international person only through recognition, i.e., when recognized
by other states. In contrast, the declaratory doctrine holds that in-
ternational law is an objective system which dictates the conditions
under which a state becomes a member of the international community
so that the rights and duties of a state remain independent of formal
recognition. A state may exist without being recognized, if it exists
in fact regardless of whether it has been formally recognized by other
states, and it has a right to be treated by them as a state. Under
this theory, the function of recognition is to acknowledge as a fact
something which was uncertain, the independence of the body claim-
ing to be a state, and to accept the usual courtesies of international
intercourse. The recognition of a state implies the acceptance by one
state of another into the legal framework of international law. The
recognition of a government, however, is the acceptance of the lawful
agent of that state with the establishment of diplomatic relations and
the creation of formal means of communication between the govern-
ments of two states. The entry into diplomatic relations may imply
approval of a new government in the other, and this is only at the
governmental and not the state level. The granting of recognition by
a state involves the making of factual determinations tempered with
considerations of policy. 9
On occasion, adherence to civilized standards or standards of
humanity has been asserted as a condition for recognition and admis-
sion to the international community as occurred following World War
I in requiring adherence by the new states of eastern Europe to the
minorities treaties.
Some writers contend that a state or government must adhere
to minimum standards of human rights to merit recognition. Accord-
ingly, one scholar has proposed that American nations might express
collective disapproval of anti-democratic revolutions within the
Western Hemisphere by withholding or restricting diplomatic repre-
sentation.' However, this approach has proven ineffective without em-
bargos, and the practical effect of withholding recognition is dubious.
78. Morrison, Recognition in International Law: A Functional Reappraisal, 34
U. CHi. L. REV. 857 (1967).
79. Alexandrowicz-Alexander, The Quasi-Judicial Function in Recognition of
States and Governments, 46 AM. J. INTL. L. 631 (1952).
80. See, e.g., Fenwick, The Recognition of De Facto Governments: Is There a
Basis for InterAmerican Collective Action?, 58 AM. J. INT'L 109 (1964).
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Another writer has contended that, in the light of the withholding
of recognition of Rhodesia and the assertion of the principle of self-
determination, the requirement of good government has been added
to the traditional requirements of statehood. This requirement is lack-
ing where there is a systematic denial of rights to a substantial minori-
ty, and still more to a majority of the people, of a place and say in
the government as well." However, this cannot be regarded as a prin-
ciple of international law. Rhodesia may still be regarded as a state
though not recognized and the principle is not adhered to by South
Africa." Sir Alec Douglas Home has stated:
If nations feel entitled to use, to invoke, mandatory sanc-
tions because the constitution falls short of the standards
of democracy that we require, we should be at war with
half the world today . . . 88
Humanitarian intervention when undertaken militarily is limited
by the Charter of the United Nations. Intervention without legal in-
vitation may constitute aggression. Article 2, Paragraph 5 of the
Charter requires signatories to refrain from the threat or use of armed
force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any
state. However, armed force may be justified in exercising the in-
herent right of individual or collective self defense under Article 51
or under the authority of the United Nations or another competent
international body. The Declaration on Principles of International Law
Concerning Friendly Relations and Cooperation Among States with
the Charter of the United Nations, which was adopted by the General
Assembly in 1970 asserts:
(T)he strict observance by States of the obligation not to
intervene in affairs of any other State is an essential con-
dition to assure that nations live together in peace with
one another, since the practice of any form of intervention
not only violates the spirit and letter of the Charter but
also leads to the creation of situations which threaten in-
ternational peace and security . . . No State or group of
States has the right to intervene directly or indirectly, for
any reason whatever, in the internal or external affairs of
any other State. Consequently, armed intervention and all
other forms of interference or attempted threats against
81. J. FAWCETT, LAW OF NATIONS 38-39 (1968). Cf. Devine, The Requirements of
Statehood Re-Examined, 34 MOD. LAW REV. 410 (1971).
82. Devine, supra note 81.
83. Quoted in Devine, supra note 81.
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the personality of the State or against its political, economic
and cultural elements are in violation of international law
• . .No State may use or encourage the use of economic,
political or any other type of measures to coerce another
State in order to obtain from it subordination of the exer-
cise of its sovereign rights and to secure from it advan-
tages of any kind. Also, no State shall organize, assist,
foment, finance, incite or tolerate subversive activities
directed towards the violent over-throw of the regime of
another State, or interfere in civil strife in another State.8
The United Nations has assumed the role previously under-
taken by humanitarian intervention.85 It has made representations in
human rights matters and has undertaken direct or delegated use of
military intervention to maintain public order within a state and
transnationally. In many of these instances, the breakdown of order
threatened the protection of human rights. Accordingly, United Na-
tions actions in the Arab-Israel conflict, the Congo, and Cyprus con-
tained aspects of humanitarian intervention, though the motivation
was also based on the impression that the situations constituted a
threat to peace. A significant trend in the institutionalization of
humanitarian intervention is embodied in the activities of the Com-
mission on Human Rights of the Economic and Social Council.
The contention exists that even under the Charter, military in-
tervention on humanitarian grounds may be regarded as legal." As
a precedent, Reisman cites an incident in 1964 when rebels in the
Congo seized thousands of non-belligerents and held them as host-
ages for concessions from the central government and then killed 45
of the civilians and threatened to massacre the remainder. A Belgian
84. G.A. RES 2625 (XXV) (1970). The Declaration on Inadmissability of Interven-
tion, adopted by the General Assembly in 1965, RES. 2131 (XX) GAOR, XX Syoo 14
LA (6014) provides that no state has the right to intervene for any reason in the
affairs of any other state and condemns any armed intervention or any direct or in-
direct interference in another's affairs. Compare however the rationale of the Brezhnev
Doctrine justifying intervention in Czechoslavakia. Romaniecki, Sources of the Brezhnev
Doctrine of Limited Sovereignty and Intervention, 5 Is. L. REV. 527 (1970).
85. See generally J. CAREY, UNITED NATIONS PRACTICE OF CIVIL AND POLITICAL
RIGHTS (1970).
86. Reisman, supra note 10, at 7. He contends that the Preamble to the Charter
confirm the key element of the customary law of humanitarian intervention, the inter-
national character of human rights and the potential recognition of common interest
in a use of force to vindicate human rights. The Genocide Convention explicitly
characterizes actions which under historic international law would have justified
intervention.
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paratroop battalion, transported in American planes, through British
facilities were moved to the Ascension Islands. When further negotia-
tions with the rebels for the release of the hostages proved unavail-
ing, the troops entered the area and removed two thousand persons
in four days. Permission for the operation was obtained from the cen-
tral Congo Government and the troops were withdrawn with the com-
pletion of the rescue operation. The Department of state announced
that the purpose of the military operation was humanitarian and was
not intended to engage the rebel forces in combat." Although the
operation was attacked in the Security Council by several African
States and the Soviet Union, significantly, the question of the under-
taking being carried out by non-UN forces was not seriously raised.
The action was not condemned by the Security Council and most legal
scholars have considered it to have been lawful.
REISMAN further observes that, regarding intervention in the
Dominican Republic during the Johnson Administration by the United
States, most critics of the operation confirmed the lawfulness of
humanitarian intervention in international law by arguing that, if in-
deed the operation had been genuinely humanitarian, it would have
been permissible.8 President Johnson had stated that " . . . (A)s we
had to go into the Congo to preserve the lives of American citizens
and haul them out when they were being shot at, we went into the
Dominican Republic to preserve the lives of American citizens and
citizens of a good many other nations,-46 to be exact,-46 nations."89
However, the United States troops remained in the Dominican
Republic after the foreign nationals were removed. Accordingly,
REISMAN contends that, regardless of the lawfulness of the particular
operation, the incident confirmed the lawfulness of humanitarian in-
tervention. However, it is here contended that the operation, if
justifiable, involved an intervention for the protection of nations
abroad. Even on this ground, the operation should have first received
approval by the Organization of American States and perhaps the
Security Council." This is consistent with the view that a military
intervention based on the doctrine of Humanitarian Intervention may
be lawful under the Charter, even though undertaken unilaterally if
(1) for a specific limited purpose; (2) the time period of the operation
is limited only to the undertaking of the specific objective; (3) the
87. Riesman, supra note 10, at 28-29. 52 Dept. of State Bull. 18 (1964).
88. Reisman, supra note 10, at 29-31.
89. 53 DEPT. OF STATE BULL. 20 (1965).
90. Comment, The Dominican Republic: Intervention or Collective Self Defense,
60 AM. J. INTL. L. 64 (1966).
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use of coercive measures is limited; (4) and there is the lack of any
other alternative recourse."
The various organs of the United Nations is authorized and may
engage in humanitarian intervention. Where deprivation of human
rights constitutes a threat to the peace, the Security Council is
authorized to take action under Chapter VIII of the Charter. An ex-
ample of such action was in regard to Rhodesia. Article VIII of the
Genocide Convention authorizes the parties thereto to call upon com-
petent organs of the United Nations " . . . to take such action under
the Charter of the United Nations as they consider appropriate for
the prevention and suppression of acts of genocide . . . " Accordingly,
the Genocide Convention may be construed as extending the authori-
ty of the Security Council and other United Nations agencies to cope
with genocide.92
Pursuant to the Uniting for Peace Resolution, 7 the General
Assembly may take action where a breach of the peace has arisen
and the Security Council is unwilling or incapable of acting. Thus,
the Assembly could undertake humanitarian intervention. Article 13
of the Charter empowers the Assembly to "initiate studies and make
recommendations for the purpose of . . .assisting in the realization
of human rights and fundamental freedoms for all without distinction
as to race, sex, language or religion." By its authority to recommend
and assist in human rights matters, it could recommend nations and
groups to intervene in a case of deprivation of human rights. As
authority for this the Assembly may assert the broad human rights
jurisdiction of the United Nations as set out in the Preamble, Article
1, and Articles 55 and 56 of the Charter.
Secondly, the Secretary-General has authority to intervene in
matters involving a deprivation of human rights. Article 99 authorizes
him to bring to the attention of the Security Council any matter which,
in his opinion, may threaten the maintenance of international peace
and security. This authority may extend to convoking either the
Security Council or the General Assembly in emergency session.
Thirdly, Regional organizations, as provided by Chapter VIII, may
also act when consistent with the purposes and principles of the United
Nations. Article 52 both encourages member states to achieve pacific
settlements of disputes and directs the Security Council to encourage
such regional developments and to supervise settlement either on the
91. Nanda, The United States Action in the Dominican Crisis: Impact on World
Order, 43 DENVER LAW JOURNAL 439 (1966).
92. GAOR 377A V).
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initiative of the regional state members or by delegation to the Coun-
cil. Humanitarian intervention on a regional level may be preferable
in that big power confrontation would thereby be averted and the
intervention may be more effective and have more legitimizing effect
where undertaken by states with compatible cultural values. However,
the existence of these entities and their authority does not guarantee
results.
The human rights record of the United Nations is not encourag-
ing. With the General Assembly dominated by the nations of Asia
and Africa, the approach has not been one of objectively condemning
all incidents of violations of human rights. Though United Nations
organs are ready to condemn apartheid in South Africa and the white
regime in Rhodesia, it is not prepared to condemn deprivations of
human rights perpetrated by African states, such as by Burundi,
Sudan, Chad, Uganda or Nigeria nor was there any protest to the
mass killings and imprisonments in Indonesia. There is indifference
to the deprivation of human rights in Greece, Brazil, Chile, Paraguay,
Uraguay, Bangladesh, Goa, and behind the Iron Curtain. It is prac-
tically inconceivable that a United Nations organ will protest the
mistreatment of Jews in Syria and, indeed, the General Assembly
proved incapable of registering a protest against the use of poison
gas and the commission of other atrocities by Egypt in its interven-
tion in Yemen. 3
The record of the European Commission on Human Rights is
hardly more encouraging. Despite the large scale degrading and bar-
baric detentions by Britain in Northern Ireland, the Commission, in-
voking technicalities, has refused to investigate the complaints and
to take appropriate action. Statesmen hypocritically proclaim the im-
portance of protection of human rights but refuse to act when the
need arises. Such hypocrisy has led to a crisis in world order. This
has been made apparent by the inability of European and other states
to cope with international terrorism as characterized by a policy of
craven surrender to terrorists' threats, a failure to punish terrorists
and to intervene against countries knowingly harboring terrorists or
acting as accessories after the fact.
The rise of a "crazy state" may well become a ground for in-
tervention, regardless of present international norms." When a state
comes under the control of fanatics, such as was the case with Nazi
93. Ossad, supra note 76.
94. Y. DROR. CRAZY STATES: A COUNTERCONVENTIONAL STRATEGIC PROBLEM (1971);
Dror, A Global Peril, JERUSALEM POST-MAGAZINE, June 10, 1972, at 9.
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Germany, and refuses to adhere to international norms, it may well
threaten human civilization. Modern technology has greatly increased
the dangers posed by militant fanaticism which facilitates mass kill-
ing and mass terror. The havoc which fanatic groups can cause has
been aptly illustrated in Northern Ireland and by the Weathermen
in the United States and the so called Palestinian terrorists in Europe
and elsewhere. Emerging technology will allow small countries which
have money and are able to obtain some scientific and engineering
man power to produce crude nuclear devices capable of killing millions.
Chemical, biological and radioactive weapons which can be used for
mass terror are available. Even groups and movements which do not
command governmental authority or support may now be capable of
perpetrating unprecedented human destruction. A Nazi like govern-
ment with a few nuclear bombs, or even a militant group with water
solvent, tasteless, highly active toxins may become a world security
threat. Fanaticism must be countered by early recognition which may
be difficult because of the inability to understand fanaticism which
is completely different in its fundamental characteristics from the
values, mores and patterns of thinking prevalent in nearly all societies.
A counter strategy must be developed entailing innovative approaches
to identify fanaticism and to stop fanatics before they develop suffi-
cient strength to cause damage. The doctrine of humanitarian interven-
tion must be extended to intervene where a state shelters, trains and
equips fanatics. An international regime and monitoring system must
be established.
Today, after the Viet Nam War, there is a reluctance by the
United States to intervene. However, the contention has been made,
in reaction to the oil boycott, that a big power cannot renounce the
option of intervention.95 Through common sense, Professor Kristol con-
tends, nations exercise restraint. Criticizing the idealistic and
moralistic mode of American foreign policy, he argues that interven-
tion is not immoral and that for a great power non-intervention in
a civil war elsewhere is as much an active policy as intervention, as
was demonstrated by the Spanish Civil War.
In truth, the days of 'gunboat diplomacy' are never over.
(The Russians understand this, which is why they are
building so many of them). Gunboats are as necessary for
international order as police cars are for domestic order.
Smaller nations are not really worried about American atom
bombs any more than the Mafia is. And smaller nations are
95. Dristol, Gunboat Diplomacy is No Anachronism, JERUSALEM POST, Dec. 26,
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not going to behave reasonably -with a decent respect for
the interests of others, including the great powers -unless
it is costly to them to behave unreasonably."
However, in the area of human rights, the problem is also one
of seeking the compliance of great powers. Perhaps this is best il-
lustrated by the application of humanitarian intervention with regard
to the deprivation of human rights within the Soviet Union. The force
of world public opinion and representations by governments induced
the Soviet authorities to ease restrictions as to Jews seeking to leave
the Soviet Union. Representations dramatically resulted in the com-
muting of the death sentence of Jewish activists in the Leningrad
trial. However, little has been done to focus public attention and in-
voke principles of humanitarian intervention to obtain their release
from Siberian prison camps where they are being detained contrary
to Soviet law. 7
To deal with this situation, the proposed Jackson Amendment
conditions the granting of favored nation status for trade benefits and
the granting of credits upon Soviet allowance of free immigration.
However, this demand conflicts with the need for detente which is
partly based on the according of trade benefits. This issue is part
of the wider issue of whether a policy of detente may properly be
pursued with a government which suppresses fundamental human
rights. The issue has been symbolized by Soviet treatment of the Rus-
sian physicist dissenter, Sakharov, who had been subjected to public
attack in the Western press and evoked protest by Government
leaders. Due to these attacks the Soviets were compelled to moderate
their attack."
The problem came to a dramatic climax with the publication of
Solzhenitsyn's Gulag Archipelago outside the Soviet Union, a work
which is a seething indictment of the Stalin terror and the Soviet
system, accusing many officials still alive of complicity." The reaction
96. Id.
97. Garber, Leningrad Trial Victims Are Still Imprisoned, JERUSALEM POST,
Dec. 12, 1973. On the background of this trial, see Feller, The Leningrad Trial in the
Light of Soviet Law, 23 HAPRAKLIT 47 (1971). The Anti Zionist Trials, JEWS IN EASTERN
EUROPE No. 7, Nov. 1971, at 4, indicating that the accused were convicted and sentenced
in contravention to Soviet law.
98. In Defense of Sakharov, TIME, Sept. 24, 1973, at 2. Following an appeal by
Sakharov, Chancellor Willy Brandt exercised a form of humanitarian intervention by
expressing support for persecuted intellectuals, JERUSALEM POST, Sept. 5, 1973, Sept.
9, 1973, Sept. 13, 1973.
99. Smothering Dissent, TIME, Feb. 11, 1974, at 8; A Fortress of Newsprint, TIME,
Feb 18, 1974, at 10.
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of the Soviet regime in arbitrarily expelling the Nobel prize winning
author and in stripping him of his Soviet citizenship emerges as a
stark reminder of the totalitarian nature of the Soviet Union. The
fact that Solzhenitzen was not executed may well reflect some sen-
sitivity by the Soviet authorities to world reaction. But the act also
relieves the Soviets of a bothersome source of internal protest which
had amassed transnational support. Moreover, Western diplomats, bent
on their policy of detente, may well have been relieved over the
elimination of a bothersome nuisance.
The relationship of detente to human rights was illustrated by
the Helsinki Conference for European security which involved the par-
ticipation of both NATO and Warsaw pact countries. The NATO states
demanded, as one of the conditions for the easing of tension, that the
Soviets agree to the free exchange of ideas and contacts between
peoples. The Soviets and their internal affairs. However, to the
Western Europeans this was regarded as an essential precondition
to detente. But for the Soviets to accept this demand would mean the
giving up of their totalitarian regime. Apparently a meaningless com-
promise was arrived at providing for exchange of ideas but permit-
ting the Soviet rules to prevent the penetration of what they regard
as hostile. 0
The issue is whether detente is achievable with a regime which
defies standards of human civilization and tramples on fundamental
human rights by denying freedom of movement and migration,
threatens genocide, places dissidents in mental hospitals, arbitrarily
arrests and imprisons iifdividuals, and still maintains one thousand
slave labor camps containing well over one million prisoners." An-
drei Sakharov has insisted that detente must be conditioned upon
democratic reform and has urged that the Western states not refrain
from intervening in what appears to be to many the internal affairs
of the Soviet Union. 1 2
The detente benefits the Soviet regime by facilitating the receiv-
ing of technical assistance for national development. However, the
100. Comay, The European Security Conference 4-3 (76-7) GESHER 59 Dec. 1973
(In Hebrew).
101. Lansner, Dissidents and Detente, NEWSWEEK, Sept. 24, 1973, at 19; Brandt's
Dente: Even if Stalin Led the USSR, JERUSALEM POST, Sept. 23, 1973. Is Detente Morally
Blind?, NEWSWEEK, Sept. 24, 1973, at 18; Shamir, Between Two Worlds, MAARIV, Feb. 23,
1974. SAKHAROV, PROGRESS, COEXISTENCE AND INTELLECTUAL FREEDOM (1969).
102. 1.7 Million Prisoners in Soviet Labor Camps, JERUSALEM POST Mar. 5, 1974.
For oppression in Russia, see generally A. ROTHERBERG, THE HEIRS OF STALIN (1973);
E. REDDAWAY, UNCENSORED RUSSIA (1973): Friedgut, Stalin Still Hasn't Given Up,
JERUSALEM POST. Nov. 30, 1973, supp. at 13.
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alternative to detente is continued thermo-nuclear confrontation. Clear-
ly, an approach is needed which will not forsake the oppressed behind
the Iron Curtain while at the same time allowing for mutual super
power accommodation where possible.
The problem of relations with the Soviet Union is an illustration
of the limitations of humanitarian intervention. States will intervene
humanitarily if there is a constituency demanding such intervention
and will not act automatically. Security and political considerations
must be taken into account. Public pressure has caused diplomats to
make representations on behalf of the rights of Jews to emigrate from
the Soviet Union and on other occasions. But such action is limited.
Accordingly, the institutional means must be established to permit
individuals and groups to become objects of international law and to
intervene on their own behalf. Where a deprivation of human rights
occurs and domestic remedies are exhausted, the individual must have
an institution to which he may turn as of right wherein his rights
will be objectively adjudged and will act automatically. Such an in-
stitution is embodied in the proposal for the establishment of inter-
national tribunals for World Habeas Corpus which will provide
recourse to individuals who are arbitrarily detained.
Derived from the Common Law writ which enabled a court to
order a person who has been detained to appear before it and to in-
quire into his detention, World Habeas Corpus is a proposed legal
remedy suggesting that the security of the individual against arbitrary
detention or imprisonment is a paramount concern in a world public
order embodying the optimum and maximum for human dignity. The
concept of World Habeas Corpus, which proposes to limit but not
abolish national sovereignty, accommodates diverse and competitive
political systems, implementing the human rights articles of the United
Nations Charter, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the Con-
vention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide,
the Convention Against Racial Discrimination, and the Draft Cove-
nant on Political Civil Rights. Conceiving the individual as the subject
and not the object of international law, it affords the individual the
right of petition to regional international courts of World Habeas
Corpus.
World Habeas Corpus conceives of a cultural and regional ap-
proach to the protection of individual freedom by providing for nine
regional circuits which correspond to diversities in legal traditions,
culture, religion and history: (1) the Communist-Orient Circuit; (2) the
U.S.S.R. Eastern European Circuit; (3) the Western European Circuit;
(4) the Islamic Circuit; (5) the Southern African Circuit; (6) the Non-
Communist Orient Circuit; (7) the Austral-Oceanic Circuit; (8) the Latin
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American Circuit; and (9) the Anglo-American Circuit. Each of the
circuit courts would be comprised of seven judges of whom at least
four must be nationals of a state located within the area over which
the particular circuit has jurisdiction, an approach which would
facilitate states to agree to participate in this type of tribunal. To
accurately reflect the relative basis of power within the area, at least
one national from each of the world's predominant states would sit
as a judge in the circuit court having jurisdiction over that state. The
remaining judges on each circuit court must be chosen from states
outside the territory in question. The judges would be selected from
lists of nominees submitted by the member states. In addition, the
proposal conceives the establishment of a Supreme Court composed
of nine justices; one justice for each circuit who is to be a national
of a state within the circuit he represents and chosen by majority
vote of the judges comprising the circuit tribunal of each region.
The proposal would allow any detained person anywhere or any
other person on his behalf to invoke the jurisdiction of the circuit
court as soon as one has been established for the region where he
is confined. The detaining authority would have the right to intervene
in the proceedings but also should be required to bring the detinue
before the court. The petitioner would be required to exhaust
realistically available municipal remedies. The circuit courts, after
reviewing the detention, may continue the detention, order the peti-
tioner released forthwith, or order the case remanded for retrial. The
decision would not affect the validity of municipal law. A simple ma-
jority of the judges would be required for a decision. A decision to
release the petitioner would be final, but a holding that the detentionf
is legal and the petitioner's detention may be continued would be sub-
ject to appeal to the Supreme Court. For a circuit court decision to
be reversed, a two thirds majority would be required. On appeal, the
Supreme Court would apply universal principles in determining
whether the decision was so unreasonable as to require reversal.
The proposed system for World Habeas Corpus need not emerge
full blown but may come into effect with the establishment of only
one or two circuits. A precedent for such a supranational court lay
in the Court of Appeal for East Africa, which originated from His
Britainic Majesty's Court of Appeal for Eastern Africa and set up
in 1902 to exercise appellate jurisdiction. 03 The Court was
103. Kanyeihamba & Katenda, The Supranational Adjudicatory Bodies and The
Municipal Governments, Legislatures and Courts, 1972 PUBLIC LAW 107 (1972): Kato, The
Court of Appeals for East Africa: From a Colonial Court To an International Court,
7 EAST AFRICAN L.J. 1 (1971).
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reconstituted by the Treaty for East African Cooperation in 1967 and
hears appeals from Tanganyika, Uganda and Kenya. It has issued writs
of habeas corpus.
Even without the adoption of a proposed international treaty
statute, petitions for writs of World Habeas Corpus may be presented
to the Human Rights Commission of the United Nations and other
international bodies calling for the establishment of ad hoc tribunals
calling for inquiries into specific cases of arbitrary detention. Such
a petition which was drafted by the author of the concept of World
Habeas Corpus and received the support of the Dominican Republic
as a party-movant was filed before the Human Rights Commission
in the case of William N. Oatis in 1952 who was detained without
trial in Czechoslovakia. A resolution calling for the implementation
of World Habeas Corpus as a summary remedy was to be presented
to the General Assembly. Oatis, however, was freed before further
proceedings could be taken.' A similar petition for World Habeas
Corpus was filed in 1967 with the U.N. Commission on Human Rights
in behalf of Madame Ruth Tshombe, acting for her husband, Moise
Tshombe, former prime minister of the Congo, who was being detained
by Algeria after being kidnapped. Copies of the petition were served
on all U.N. missions and Washington embassies and legations directing
Algeria as the principal respondent to answer for his detention.
Tshombe was being detained and ordered for extradition to the Congo
where he had been tried in absentia, found guilty of treason, and
sentenced to death."5 In 1969, a similar petition was drawn and
directed at Syria as the Respondent who had detained two Israelis
who had been passengers on a TWA airliner hijacked by terrorists.
This petition was served on the Syrian ambassador in New York and
the detainees were released.
Quincy Wright has written that:
It is clearly within the competence of the General Assembly
to make recommendations concerning violations of human
rights, among which detention of persons without trial is
recognized as one of the most important. The more effec-
tive achievement of World Habeas Corpus by the general
acceptance of legal obligations as provided in the Covenant
of Civil and Political Rights and of a world court with
104. KUTNER, WORLD HABEAS CORPUS, 102-09 (1962); Katin, The Advocate as
Lawmaker: Luis Kutner and the Struggle for Due Process, 23 U. MIAMI L. REV. 397,
409-13 (1969).
105. Katin, supra note 104, at 414-18.
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jurisdiction to issue a writ of habeas corpus . . . is un-
doubtedly desirable, but must be considered a long range
problem. It requires as prerequisites relaxation of interna-
tional tensions, a world atmosphere of peace and mutual
confidence among states, a considerable convergence of
cultural and legal concepts throughout the world, the es-
tablishment of conditions of stability and civil order in most
countries, and experience in the application of the princi-
ple nationally, regionally, and by ad hoc recommendations
of the United Nations . . .106
A world Habeas Corpus approach was linked with the doctrine
of humanitarian intervention in regard to the case of Leonid Rigerman,
a Jew whose parents were American but was denied exit from the
Soviet Union. In a letter to the State Department's Legal Adviser,
the author of World Habeas Corpus called for United States interven-
tion and the initiation of ex parte proceedings before the International
Court on the basis of the doctrine of humanitarian intervention even
though the matter was regarded as of domestic and local considera-
tion. A similar letter was sent to the Soliciter General.17 A petition
for exit visas for Rigerman, the Drabkin family and all others similarly
situated was filed in the Presidium in Moscow naming President
Podgorney as the individual respondent. This opened the door for
Jewish emigration to Israel by increased numbers. American interven-
tion by the author of this paper took another form and Rigerman,
the Drabkins and many others were subsequently given an exist visa.
Another dramatic application of World Habeas Corpus is in
regard to detainees in Northern Ireland. In September, 1971, a petition
for habeas corpus was filed in the High Court of Belfast, Northern
Ireland and was served on Queen Elizabeth, the Prime Minister Heath,
the Home Secretary Maudling and the Prime Minister of Northern
Ireland Brian Faulkner and members of the Government of Northern
Ireland on behalf of Patrick Brendan McDonnell who had been ar-
bitrarily detained by British authorities in Northern Ireland and other
detainees as a class action. The petition requested that the detainees,
arrested under the Special Powers Act of 1922 be charged with a
crime and tried or be released. When the Court rejected this peti-
tion, a second petition was filed requesting the Queen to direct both
106. Wright, Steps in the Realization of World Habeas Corpus, in KUTNER, THE
HUMAN RIGHT TO INDIVIDUAL FREEDOM, A SYMPOSIUM ON WORLD HABEAS CORPUS 159,
168-69 (1970) [hereinafter cited as Symposium].
107. Letter by Kutner to John Stevenson, Legal Adviser, United States Depart-
ment of State February 12, 1971.
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houses of the Parliament to declare the Special Powers Act null and
void. On the rejection of this Petition and the exhaustion of local
"remedies", a Petition was filed with the European Commission on
Human Rights which, on the technicality of questioning the Petitioner's
power of attorney, refused to hear the case.108 This was remedied and
hundreds of detainees have been released prior to formal hearings.
The case again illustrated the need for a transnational constituency.
The large number of Irish in the United States has prompted members
of Congress to become concerned and congressional hearings have been
held. But the Irish Americans are generally apathetic and shockingly
insensitive.
The idea of World Habeas Corpus has received world wide sup-
port by lawyers, jurists, scholars and statesmen. The Honorable
Arthur Goldberg contends that the idea of World Habeas Corpus "can
only be applauded."' Associate Supreme Court Justice William J.
Brennan regards World Habeas Corpus as a "concrete program
whereby the now only morally binding Universal Declaration of Human
Rights would be made, by the voluntary consent of the nations of
the world, a legally binding commitment enforceable in an interna-
tional court of habeas corpus which would function through appropri-
ately accessible regional courts." 10 Professor Myres S. McDougal has
written that "for the larger community of mankind genuinely aspiring
toward improved implementation of human rights, the proposal for
internationalizing habeas corpus would appear to offer plausible hope
for remedying the greatest defect in its present armory of institutional
practices." ''
The catalyst for the idea of World Habeas Corpus, as it first
evolved in 1931, was the rise of Nazi Germany. The initial reaction
was one of apathy but received the support of such scholars as Dean
Roscoe Pound, Professor John Dewey, Professor Hersh Lauterpacht,
and others. In 1937, the late Senator Arthur Vanderberg supported
the proposal and subsequently obtained the support of Eleanor
Roosevelt. Vanderberg sought to have reference made to World
Habeas Corpus in the United Nations Charter and at San Francisco
Conference, the term was on the threshold of being inserted in the
Human Rights articles. The concept has been endorsed by the
American Bar Association and at international legal conferences. 2
108. Cong. Record, Sept. 18, 1973, Insertion by Rep. Biaggi.
109. Symposium, supra note 106, at 7.
110. Id. at 87.
111. Id at 91.
112. Id. at 21-22.




The realization of World Habeas Corpus may well overcome the
international malaise now prevailing. International relations and
adherence to international law have been buttressed by a standard
of civilization and humanitarian intervention which was invoked when
this standard was violated. A group may be regarded as civilized
where it has acquired a mature approach of thought and action and
is characterized by the extensive use of rational behavior patters."'
This standard was embodied in international law as in concern for
protection of foreign nations. It was based on a recognition of equals.
Following World War I, this adherence to a standard of civilization
began to disintegrate. What Oswald Spengler had called the "Decline
of the West" seemed to materialize as was characterized by the tolera-
tion of the Hitler and Stalinist terror and by the appeasement at
Munich."' Though during and following World War II statesmen have
paid lip service to principles of civilization as expressed in the pro-
tection of fundamental human rights, the decline of civilized standards
in fact continued as manifested by the development of mass weapons
of destruction, the War in Viet Nam, and police state regimes and
genocide in Uganda, Chad, Burundi, Northern Ireland, Indonesia, the
Philippines, Greece, Brazil, Chile and the Soviet Union. The nadir to
world civilization, particularly in Western Europe has been shown by
the ready surrender to and negotiation with terrorists who readily
commit murder and scoff at the rule of law and all standards of hu-
manity. Instead of undertaking firm action against states which harbor
and aid and abet terrorism, the Europeans welcome and honor these
heads of states. The ready bowing to the apparent threat of an oil
boycott is another example of this malaise. This disintegration can
well lead either to the ultimate triumph of tyranny or to universal
destruction.
The implementation of World Habeas Corpus, even on a partial
or ad hoc basis could well make a dramatic turning point. Today, more
than ever before, Sir Winston Churchill's words that "World Habeas
Corpus is the difference between civilization and tyranny" is of press-
ing relevance. As Tran Tam of Viet Nam stated, "contemporary
civilization is the civilization of human rights." 5 World Habeas Corpus
envisions a vertical relationship between states with no state subduing
another. It is a relationship of reciprocity. Accordingly, intervention
113. Schwarzenberger, Civilization and International Law, 8 CURRENT LEGAL
REPORTS 212 (1955).
114. Binari, Decline of the European Countries, 3-4 (76-7) GESHER 48 (Dec. 1978).
115. Symposium, supra note 106, at 22.
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is conceived to be undertaken in accordance with law as part of a
structure for peace.
Humanitarian intervention, expressed by diplomatic representa-
tions and only rarely-if at all-by military means, would be a means
for seeking the implementation of World Habeas Corpus tribunal deter-
minations. World Habeas Corpus is an institutionalized means of
humanitarian intervention. It may well avert international conflict.
For example, Prime Minister Indira Gandhi of India admitted that
if an international means had existed to obtain the release of Sheik
Majibur Rahmon, India's intervention in Bangladesh and the resulting
military conflict might have been averted. " '
World habeas Corpus is an essential part of a system for inter-
national peace which would also include an international war crimes
tribunal and the development of international penal law. Humanitarian
intervention must be conceived as a institutional means for implemen-
tation of international adjudication.
Human rights pertinent to individual freedom, including the right
to travel and the right to be let alone, has historically encountered
narrow-mindedness which is an unfortunate special characteristic when
new worlds of ideas are beginning. In the light of fantastic realities
in the advances of technology it would be expected that nations, states-
men and international scholars would be eager to revise domestic and
international laws and knowledge which are considered sacrosanct for
centuries but are nevertheless called in question by new humane
knowledge and world concern. The advance of implementing concretely
individual freedom by the competent remedy of World Habeas Corpus
has made progress in overcoming the reactionary army of the dark-
age ignorance that is trying to dam up the expanding intellectual flood
of human dignity and decency.
World Habeas Corpus asserts that a new world must be con-
quered in the teeth of all the unteachable in the name of humane
truth and human reality. World Habeas Corpus fulfills mankind's
aspirations for individual liberty. It forecasts an open society where
individual freedom will respond to the test of substance overcoming
the futile legalities of dictatorship or tyrannies.
116. Jerusalem Post, Dec. 17, 1971.
"Human rights are civil liberties, private rights, court procedures and the whole
gamut of municipal law. On the international scale they are a minimum standard to
which laws conserving the freedom of the individual should comply. If this minimum
standard is not maintained then neither pseudo religious ceremonies nor the high flown
phrases of politicians or academics will make any difference." Beddard, Book Review,
34 MOD. L. REV. 704, 707 (1971).
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HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION
World Habeas Corpus fulfills the humane concept that the right
to personal security emanates in a persons' legal and uninterrupted
enjoyment of his life, his limbs, his body, his health and his reputa-
tion. It includes the right to exist and the right to enjoyment of life
while existing and it is invaded not only by a deprivation of life but
also by a deprivation of those things that are necessary to the enjoy-
ment of life according to the nature, temperament and lawful desires
of the individual. Life, liberty and security need no explanation. They
are the fundamental precepts of any system of human rights. Im-
manuel Kant described liberty as "the one sole original inborn right
belonging to every man by virtue of his humanity." This includes the
right of freedom of movement which consists of the power of locomo-
tion without restraint except by due process. Further, the security
of one's privacy against invasion by police is basic to a free society.
The right of assembly and the right of association are intimately
linked. A fundamental principle of a civilized society is political
freedom of the individual. Freedom of expression is also a positive
element in the progress of a civilized society. The right to a free trial
is the essence of judicial protection. All of these rights can be im-
plemented by the imperative remedy of World Habeas Corpus for a
surviving system of world public order.
The effectiveness of this system of world order must hinge on
the development of a transnational constituency to champion the cause
of those whose rights are denied and to protest crime against humani-
ty. Accordingly, World Habeas Corpus conceives of the establishment
of World Freedom Centers to function as advocates of mankind and
world ombudsmen. Thereby the activistic flood can be made to recede.
The irresistible drive toward achieving liberty and the struggle
for a just legal order are in constant confrontation with the problems
of liberty. The idealism of liberty reflects the concrete-historical con-
dition of the life of a world society fragmented by competitive, diverse
political systems and religious fanatacisms. Since the premise of law
underpins the existence of liberty, man does not enjoy untrammeled
license, but is limited by the bounds and necessities of his actions
with the existing reality of governmental reconciliations which are
always in flux.
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